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GARY KING Haward University 
W e propose a comprehensive statistical model for analyzing multiparty, district-level elections. This model, which provides a tool for comparative politics research analogous to that which regression analysis provides in the American two-party context, can be used to explain or predict how 
geographic distributions of electoral results depend upon economic conditions, neighborhood ethnic 
compositions, campaign spending, and other features of the election campaign or aggregate areas. We also 
provide new graphical representations for data exploration, model evaluation, and substantive interpretation. 
We illustrate the use of this model by attempting to resolve a controversy over the size of and trend in the 
electoral advantage of incumbency in Britain. Contraiy to previous analyses, all based on measures now 
known to be biased, we demonstrate that the advantage is small but meaningfkl, varies substantially across 
the parties, and is not growing. Finally, we show how to estimate the party from which each party's advantage 
is predominantly drawn. 
w e propose the first internally consistent statis- tical model for analyzing multiparty, district- level aggregate election data. Our model can 
be applied directly to explain or predict how the 
geographic distribution of electoral results depends 
upon economic conditions, neighborhood ethnic com- 
positions, campaign spending, or other features of the 
election campaign or characteristics of the aggregate 
areas. We also provide several new graphical represen- 
tations for help in data exploration, model evaluation, 
and substantive interpretation.1 
Our general model is intended to address three 
serious lacunae in the study of comparative politics. 
First, most literatures focusing on non-American elec- 
tions are dominated by survey data alone rather than 
also including studies of real election results.2 Survey 
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Our model can also be used to evaluate features of electoral 
systems, such as whether the districting system is fair to all the 
political parties and electorally responsive, although we leave details 
of this task to future work. 
A few examples of the good survey analyses conducted in multi- 
party democracies include those in England (e.g., Goodhart and 
research has enormous advantages for studying indi- 
vidual-level preferences, but as analyses of random 
selections of isolated individuals from unknown geo- 
graphical locations, they necessarily miss much of 
electoral politics. As such, they are often best comple- 
mented with studies of aggregate electoral returns. 
Second, with surprisingly few exceptions, electoral 
analyses in comparative politics based on real election 
returns use national rather than regional, district, or 
precinct-level data.3 This approach has the advantage 
of allowing more countries to be included in the 
analysis without much data collection effort, but it also 
has serious disadvantages. Aggregate national-level 
studies prevent researchers from learning where votes 
come from and why, and they generally result in studies 
based on small numbers of observations and little 
variation on many relevant dimensions. Studies of 
postwar OECD countries usually contain only about a 
dozen observations (see Paldam 1991,18, Table I), and 
analvses of former communist countries could include 
onlithree or four free elections. This is often insuffi- 
cient information with which to parse out many of the 
interesting effects, and it ignores the substantial infor- 
mation content in the often vast differences across 
different regions of a country. 
Finally, the vast majority of electoral studies in 
multiparty democracies dichotomize the electoral sys- 
tem into a pseudo-two-party contest. Researchers an- 
alyze the vote for the incumbent party versus all others 
grouped together, or the vote for a-particular group, 
such as left-wing parties, versus the combination of all 
Bhansali 1970), Mexico (Dominguez and McCann 1996), Poland 
(Przeworski 1996), Peru (Stokes 1996), Russia (White et al. 1997), 
Denmark (Miller and Listhaug 1985), Italy (Bellucci 1984), and West 
Germany (Frey and Schneider 1980) as well as multicountry studies 
(Lewis-Beck 1988), among many others. 
Such national-level studies have used data from France (Rosa and 
Amson 1976), Japan (Inoguchi 1980), England (Whiteley 1980), and 
Italy (Bellucci 1984); time-series of cross-sectional data from multi- 
ple countries (Host and Paldam 1990; Paldam 1986,1991; Powell and 
Whitten 1993); and single cross-sections of multiple countries 
(Lewis-Beck and Bellucci 1982), among many others. Subnational 
analyses include Bellucci (1984, 1991), Conford, Dorling, and Tether 
(1995), Rattinger (1991), Slider (1994). 
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the others. This procedure has the advantage of en- 
abling the use of standard statistical methods, but since 
these methods are best applied to the study of two- 
party systems (largely in U.S. data), two serious prob- 
lems result: bias and information loss. The procedure is 
biased whenever all parties do not field candidates in 
every election district. For example, even when the 
governing party contests every election, different num- 
bers of parties composing the "other" category will 
generally have large effects on a variable such as the 
percentage of the vote for the governing party. Because 
the vote a party expects to receive will normally be 
related to whether it runs a candidate, the observed 
variable will systematically overstate the true underly- 
ing support for the governing party when its true 
support is highest. For example, when the governing 
party is expected to do so well that it scares off 
opposition parties from running their own candidates, 
the fraction of the vote actually received by the gov- 
erning party will exceed its true support in the elector- 
ate. This, and other similar problems, can combine to 
induce severe bias in inferences based on such data. 
Moreover, even if partially contested elections hap- 
pen to cause no bias in a particular case, important 
information, critical to comparative politics, is always 
lost by these methods. For example, when the eco- 
nomic pain caused by promarket reforms in postcom- 
munist countries results in the reformers being thrown 
out of office (Przeworski 1991), or when the increasing 
salience of ethnic divisions upsets the political order 
(Horowitz 1985, 1993; Offe 1992; Tucker 1996), which 
parties benefit? How do the electoral fortunes of each 
of the parties depend on the degree of economic 
hardship or ethnic divisions? Answering these ques- 
tions about multiparty systems requires statistical mod- 
els that permit multiparty outcomes. Shoehorning a 
complex multiparty democracy into a fake two-party 
system in order to perform an analysis that looks like 
those conducted in American politics takes the wrong 
lessons from that subfield. Making methodological 
decisions merely to accommodate the requirements of 
familiar statistical methods risks missing the most 
distinctive and interesting aspects of the electoral 
system under analysis. The bottom line is that multi- 
party systems require the development of multiparty 
statistical models. It would appear that much substan- 
tive knowledge can be gained, and bias reduced, by 
designing models of electoral systems with the special 
features of these systems in mind. 
Although we intend our model to be applicable to a 
wide variety of multiparty electoral data, we apply it 
here to resolve one important scholarly controversy: 
the size of and trend in the electoral advantage of 
incumbency in the United Kingdom. For decades, the 
conventional wisdom has been that U.K. incumbency 
advantage is small to nonexistent and not increasing, 
but this conclusion has come under strong attack 
recently by researchers whose results seem to show that 
incumbency advantage is moderate to large and grow- 
ing fast. Unfortunately, it turns out that all estimates 
given in the literature are based on measures now 
known to be biased. In partial agreement and disagree- 
ment with the substantive results from both sides, we 
demonstrate that the incumbency advantage is small 
but markedly different for each of Britain's three major 
parties. Our methods also provide information that 
others have not attempted to estimate, such as the 
party from which each party's incumbency advantage is 
primarily drawn. The study of incumbency advantage in 
the United States has been greatly enhanced by a 
quarter-century of scholarly work that has increased 
the precision and accuracy of estimates in this two- 
party system, and we hope a similar gain will result in 
electoral studies of multiparty democracies, such as the 
United Kingdom. 
From a methodological perspective, analyses of ag- 
gregate electoral data fall into two fundamental cate- 
gories that should be carefully distinguished-contex- 
tual effects and ecological inferences. Research 
questions about the relationships; among aggregate 
variables require a model of contextual effects, such as 
that offered here (or, e.g., Huckfeldt and Sprague 
1993). In contrast, research questions about the char- 
acteristics of the individuals who make up aggregate 
electoral data require ecological inferences and the 
special models designed for this purpose (see King 
1997). For example, a study of the effect on the vote for 
more liberal parties of having a college in town is a 
contextual effect, for which the model we propose is 
directly useful. In contrast, using aggregate electoral 
data to study whether college students are more likely 
than others to vote for liberal political parties requires 
an ecological inference. Our statistical model applies to 
questions at the district level, such as incumbency 
advantage estimates or predicting which candidate will 
win. Formal models of individual behavior may be of 
interest for some purposes, but they are not always 
necessary in cases like these. For much of our discus- 
sion, we make the common assumption that candidates 
are strategic and well informed. Our working (testable) 
assumption about voters is that, conditional on the 
candidates, their voting behavior follows regular pat- 
terns of some sort. 
In the sections that follow, we briefly describe our 
motivating substantive problem, discuss the more gen- 
eral characteristics of multiparty electoral data, sum- 
marize the problems that need to be resolved in order 
to develop a general statistical model for these data, 
introduce a simple version of the model for cases in 
which all parties contest, introduce assumptions to deal 
with partially contested elections, and show how to 
estimate the model and compute quantities of interest 
from these estimates. We present substantive results as 
the model is developed. 
INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGE IN 
GREAT BRITAIN 
Until the 1980s, scholars generally agreed that British 
elections were decided by national and not local forces. 
The electoral advantage of incumbency was thought to 
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be essentially nonexistent in Britain.4 For example, 
Butler and Stokes (1969, 6) repeatedly emphasize "the 
importance of national political issues and events as 
opposed to more local influences on the choice of the 
individual elector." They even go so far as to conclude 
(p. 8) that "so important are the [national] parties in 
giving meaning to contests in the individual parliamen- 
tary constituencies in Britain that for many voters 
candidates have no identity other then their partisan 
one" (see also Butler and Kavanagh 1980, 292). 
The few numerical estimates of incumbency advan- 
tage in Britain come from a newer liteiature that 
contradicts this conventional wisdom. For example, 
Curtice and Steed (1980, 1983) find the "sophomore 
surge" for Labour-the average difference in the vote 
for Labour in open seats it wins and the vote in the 
subsequent election for the now-incumbent Labour 
party candidate-was about 1,500 votes (about 3.8%) 
in the 1979 and 1983 elections. Norton and Wood 
(1990) modify sophomore surge by correcting for re- 
gional swings and find a surge of 1.6% for the Conser- 
vatives and a remarkable 7.8% for Labour. Finally, 
Wood and Norton (1992), along with the prominent 
survey-based analyses of Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 
(1987), also strongly argue for the proposition that 
incumbency advantage is increasing. 
Although the idea of sophomore surge, on which 
most measures are based, is very intuitive, Gelman and 
King (1990) prove that it gives biased estimates of the 
causal effect of incumbency. In fact, in Britain, the 
problem may actually be worse than in two-party 
systems: Because most British elections have very few 
sophomores (usually only about two dozen), the mea- 
sure discards more than 95% of the district observa- 
tions and is therefore exceptionally inefficient. More- 
over, the measure is usually applied without controls 
and without any feature of the statistical model which 
recognizes that the system being analyzed has more 
than two parties. 
Thus, we have .on one side the conventional wisdom, 
based on many years of traditional analyses, that 
incumbents have no electoral advantage. On the other 
side, we have a growing systematic quantitative litera- 
ture which argues that the incumbency advantage is 
moderate to large and steadily growing. We hope to 
resolve this scholarly dispute. 
Our data for this article include constituency-level 
election results from England for 1959 to 1992. We also 
have more limited data from the 1955 elections, which 
we use whenever possible. Geographic districts in 
England are called "constituencies," but we use the two 
words interchangeably because our model applies 
more generally. For convenience, we usually refer to 
The concept of the "personal vote" is used in Britain to include any 
local, candidate-specific effects, but for empirical analyses it is 
normally treated synonymously with incumbency advantage. In the 
United States the personal vote is considered to be the fraction of the 
incumbent's advantage attributable to the person rather than the 
party. For this article, we use only the total effect and refer to it as the 
"incumbency advantage," as is most common in the American 
political science literature (see Gelman and King 1990 for a formal 
definition). 
the Liberal Party and its alliance with the Social 
Democratic Party more simply as the Alliance.5 
CHARACTERISTICS OF MULTIPARTY DATA 
We now identify the statistically important character- 
istics of multiparty electoral data. We first do so in 
simple algebraic terms and then translate the algebra 
into a useful graphic display. 
Let Vij denote the proportion of the yote (the 
underline denotes our mnemonic labeling convention) 
in district i (i = 1, . . . , n)  for party j (j = 1, . . . , J). 
Two fundamental features of multiparty voting data 
are that each proportion falls within the unit interval 
V-,. E [0, 11 for all i and j, (1) 
and the set of vote proportions for all the parties in a 
district sum to one: 
J 
Vij = 1 for all i. (2) 
j=1 
Thus, an important criterion of a good (and logically 
possible) statistical model of multiparty voting data is 
that it satisfies the constraints in equations 1 and 2. 
Variables that meet these constraints fall in a region 
generally referred to as the simplex. 
We now illustrate this simplex sample space graph- 
ically for the two- and then the three-party case. For 
each case, we apply a simple trick to reduce the number 
of dimensions required, making the graphical presen- 
tation more manageable and ultimately informative, 
without losing information. The graphic version of 
these relationships will also be useful for exploring the 
data and understanding the model fit. 
For the two-party example, we use ViD for the 
Democratic and ViR for the Republican shares of the 
vote in district i for candidates for the U.S. House of 
Representatives. Obviously, we can easily represent 
both variables by just one, say, ViD, since the other is 
merely ViR = 1 - ViD. Figure 1A plots ViD by ViR. 
Because of the constraint in equation 2, all district vote 
fractions fall on a single line segment, and due to the 
constraint in equation 1, the line ends at the axes. Thus, 
all the points in the two-dimensional plane in Figure 
1A fall on a simpler one-dimensional line segment. 
Presenting this line segment in Figure 1B reduces the 
problem from two to one dimension without losing any 
information. 
Figure 2 provides analogous information for three 
parties. Figure 2A plots in three dimensions the three 
variables from the British electoral system, Vie, ViL, 
and Vd, for the Conservative, Labour, and Alliance 
vote proportions, respectively. The constraints in equa- 
5 We began with the data set "British General Elections, 1955-1992," 
(version 8, August 1993), constructed by D.F.L. Dorling of the 
University of Newcastle, extracted data from England only, updated 
it, and added information on incumbency status. The number of 
observations in our data for each election year are: 1955, 460; 1959, 
460; 1964, 455; 1966, 488; 1970, 471; 1974 (Feb.), 463; 1974 (Oct.), 
491; 1979, 467; 1983, 491; 1987, 522; and 1992, 521. 
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FIGURE 1. The Sim~lex for Two Parties 
A. 2 Parties, 2 Dimensions 
0 .25 .5 -75 1 
ViD 
B. 2 Parties, 1 Dimension 
Mote: This figure explains graphically how to reduce two vote variables 
to one dimension. Graph A portrays the familiar relationship between 
the vote for the Republicans (V,,) and Democrats (V,,) in the U.S. 
two-party system; because of the constraints of equations 1 and 2, all 
soints fall on a line segment and can be portrayed more simply as 
Braph B. 
tion 2 imply that valid points must fall on the plane 
cutting through the three-dimensional space. The con- 
straints in equation 1 require this plane to end at each 
of the three axes. The resulting area that satisfies both 
constraints is the equilateral triangle shaded in A. 
Because all the points in three dimensions fall in a 
two-dimensional area, we can save space by presenting 
the triangle alone in two dimensions, which we do in 
Figure 2B. This graph is a version of a ternary diagram 
(or trilinear, triaxial, or barycentric plot; see Upton 
1989, 1994), to which we have added several new 
features. In this triangle, each dot fully characterizes a 
single constituency result from the 1979 British elec- 
tion. Roughly speaking, the closer a dot is to a vertex 
(with a party's label, C, L, or A), the higher is the vote 
total for that party; more precisely, a vote total for a 
party equals the perpendicular distance from the side 
of the triangle opposite to the labeled vertex, as 
calibrated on the scales we have added. That is. the 
vertical positions of the dots in the figure indicate the 
values of Vic, as indicated on the scale on the left. As 
a dot falls farther from the side opposite the L vertex, 
the larger is the 6, variable (as can be seen by 
comparing the point to the scale at the top). 
For exam~le. in addition to the real data. we have 
added one (hypothetical) election result as a small box 
in the bottom left of Figure 2B. In order to clarify how 
to read the voting results in this district. we added 
dashed lines conn&ting this point to the three axes. In 
this district, the Conservatives received 25% of the 
vote, as can be seen by following the dashed line from 
the box to the left axis that calibrates V,,. The dashed 
line traces the shortest distance from 'the axis to the 
point, that is, a line perpendicular to the axis. The same 
district also gave 25% of its vote to the Labour Party 
(see the dashed line that heads northward to the V,, 
axis) and half its votes to the Alliance (as can be 
determined from the dashed line that heads down to 
the right to meet the V, axis). The electoral results for 
all the real districts, represented by dots, also can be 
read by tracing out perpendicular lines to each axis. 
With all this precision available when needed, it is still 
' worth remembering the easier rough way to interpret 
this ternary diagram: The closer a point is to a vertex of 
the triangle, the more votes that district gave to the 
party whose label appears there. 
We have removed most of the sides of the triangle in 
order to make visible districts with zero votes for one of 
the parties. For example, districts uncontested by the 
Alliance fall on the right side of the triangle, where the 
bottom axis reveals that V, = 0. Substantively, these 
partially contested districts appear to be generated by a 
different process than the mass of (fully contested) 
districts that fall inside the triangle. This can be seen 
since the distribution of points does not gradually get 
smaller (or larger) as it approaches the side of the 
triangle; instead, there appears to be an area without 
dots, indicating every party that merely appears on the 
ballot receives at least 15-20% of the vote. 
We have also added lines that divide the triangle into 
thirds. We call these win lines, since they indicate 
which party wins, depending on the region in which a 
point falls. For example, if a point falls in the region at 
the top of the graph, the Conservatives win a plurality 
of the votes and (by the electoral rules) the seat for that 
constituency. Points that fall within the left region are 
wins for the Alliance, and those in the right go to the 
Labour Party. The same logic applies to multiparty 
elections with J > 3 parties, even though graphical 
displays become more unwieldy. 
PROBLEMS TO RESOLVE 
Standard regression-type models applied to multiparty 
electoral data usually generate nonsensical results. For 
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FIGURE 2. The Simplex for Three Parties 
A. 3 Parties, 3 Dimensions B. 3 Parties, 2 Dimensions 
0 
Note: In a manner analogous to Figure 1, this figure reduces three vote variables to two dimensions. Graph A portrays the relationship among the votes 
for the Conservative (V,/,,), labour (Vi,), and Alliance (V,) parties; because of the constraints of equations 1 and 2, all points fall on an equilateral triangle 
that is the intersection of a plane with the three dimensional figure. Graph B portrays this more simply in two dimensions in a version of what is known 
as a "ternary diagram." Values of the three variables can be read by where the dots fall perpendicular to the three numbered axes. The little square point 
(with dotted lines referencing the axes) is the example discussed in the text. 
example, one common approach is to use the vote for 
each party as a dependent variable (fraction for the 
Conservatives, fraction for the Labour Party, etc.) and 
to regress each on a set of explanatory variables. These 
J regressions are run separately, or via a "seemingly 
unrelated" system of equations. Since neither con- 
straint from equations 1 and 2 is satisfied, this ap- 
proach generally fails to give sensible results. That is, 
the results often imply that some parties will get fewer 
than zero votes, or that the sum of votes for all parties 
will be greater or less than 100%. Moreover, even when 
point predictions happen to fall within the constraints 
of the simplex, the full probabilistic implications of the 
model are virtually always logically impossible, as some 
of the predictive density always falls outside the sim- 
plex. Some of the few who recognize this problem 
transform Kj  to an unbounded scale (separately for 
each party j), such as with a logistic function, and then 
apply separate or seeming unrelated regressions, but 
this, too, is insufficient: The results will satisfy equation 
1 but not equation 2. Similarly, running only J - 1 
regressions and computing the predictions for ViJ from 
the others satisfies equation 2 but not equation 1. 
Various other ad hoc approaches can be taken to 
correct different parts of the problem, but especially 
because computing most quantities of interest requires 
the full probabilistic model, we decided to pursue a 
more general approach. 
The model we develop can be considered a general- 
ization of two independent lines of statistical research. 
The first line includes models for "compositional data" 
(Aitchison 1986), a term that describes data sets with 
multiple outcome variables that sum to unity for each 
observation. A few of the many examples of composi- 
tional data from other fields include soil samples in 
geology and pedology (with measurements of the frac- 
tions of sand, silt, and clay), rock samples in geochem- 
' istry (with fractions of alkali, Fe203, and M,O), and 
blood measurements in biology (proportions of white 
blood cell types measured for each patient). Composi- 
tional data are also common in political science and 
economics (as in multiparty voting data, the allocation 
of ministerial portfolios among political parties, trade 
flows or international conflict directed from each na- 
tion to several others, or proportions of budget expen- 
ditures in each of several categories), but researchers in 
these fields have not taken advantage of the connection 
to this more general statistical approach. That is un- 
fortunate, because compositional data seem to be 
closely related to the raison d'&tre of political science 
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research: If politics is the authoritative allocation of 
resources, then fractions of resources received by each 
group are exactly compositional data. 
The key contribution of this literature is statistical 
models that allow only possible outcomes to occur. 
That is, predictions or simulations from such a model 
satisfy equations 1 and 2 or, in other words, have 
positive density only over the simplex. The most influ- 
ential models of compositional data are due primarily 
to Aitchison (1986), who criticized earlier models 
based on Dirichlet distributions (see citations in Aitchi- 
son 1986, 61-2), since those models require the ratios 
of "compositions" (votes for each party in our applica- 
tion) to be independent. Aitchison avoided this unre- 
alistic assumption by applying the normal distribution 
to the log-ratios of the individual components. This 
procedure starts with the multivariate normal fit to the 
unconstrained real plane and then maps it into the 
simplex via the multivariate logistic transformation. 
This works in the same way as, for example, the 
log-normal maps the real number line onto the positive 
real numbers. 
The second line of research that we generalize are 
models of votes and seats for two-party systems 
(Gelman and King 1991, 1994a, 1994b; King 1989a; 
King and Browning 1987; King and Gelman 1991) and 
for multiparty systems (King 1990). Like compositional 
models, some of these vote and seat models also 
transform votes (in different ways) using logistic trans-. 
formations and then stochastically model the trans- 
formed variables. The resulting statistical models differ 
in a variety of ways, but they also constrain the result to 
the proper sample space so that equations 1 and 2 are 
satisfied. 
Unfortunately, the models from neither line of re- 
search will work without modification for multiparty 
voting data. One problem is that our extensive evalu- 
ations of the assumptions of normality underlying the 
models proposed for compositional data (which we 
present belowj indicate that they do not fit real election 
data. Another problem is that these models also do not 
capture a fundamental feature of voting data: the 
pattern of "missing data" that occurs when at least one 
party receives zero votes in a district, as when it 
presents no candidate for election in a district. Zero 
vote totals in electoral data constitute politically crucial 
information and therefore must be treated very differ- 
ently from examples in which zeros entries are consid- 
ered indicators of missing data, due to slight measure- 
ment error (as when instruments for measuring the 
compositions of soil samples miss the always-present 
traces of some elements). The models discussed above 
for analyses of seats and votes fit two-party systems well 
and (King 1990) they can fit multiparty data on seats 
given votes, and some of these include special features 
for uncontested districts, but they are not directly 
applicable to explaining or predicting multiparty elec- 
toral data. 
Thus, a proper model of multiparty voting data must 
have the following special features. It must have posi- 
tive density only over the simplex and must use a 
distribution more flexible than the multivariate normal, 
which does not fit real voting data. It also must allow 
covariates (explanatory variables). Below, we provide 
this basic model for fully contested district elections. 
The model also must provide special features to deal 
with uncontested and partially contested seats, which 
we do in the subsequent section. The complete likeli- 
hood function is then given. 
Finally, a proper model must allow for estimates of 
precisely the quantities of scholarly interest, and these 
may differ across applications. That is, we should not 
have to teach readers to interpret the arcane results of 
statistical models; rather, the models should be modi- 
fied to produce results in the form of most natural 
interest to substantively oriented political scientists. 
For example, the raw coefficients estimated by models 
of compositional data are not the quantities of interest 
for any political or, indeed, virtuallx any nonpolitical 
application. We use methods of simulation, described 
below, to compute estimates of a wide range of theo- 
retically interesting quantities. These methods are crit- 
ical to political science applications of this new model. 
We also believe the methods will enable those in other 
scholarly disciplines, who use somewhat related models 
for very different purposes, to compute numerical 
quantities of more interest to their research than the 
usual results of compositional data models. 
THE BASIC MODEL FOR FULLY 
CONTESTED ELECTIONS 
In this section, we only consider district elections in 
which all parties contest and every party gets at least 
one vote: Vij E (0, 1) for all i and j. Because, in 
practice, no officially registered candidate who appears 
on the ballot ever gets fewer than 15-20% of the vote 
in our data, the only real assumption here is that all 
parties contest all district elections. We generalize this 
model to deal with partially contested elections in the 
next section. 
Let Vi = (Vil, . . . , Vi(j-,)) be a (J - 1) X 1 vector 
for each district i (i = 1, . . . , n). This vector contains 
all the information in the individual vote fractions, 
since the votes for party J can be computed determin- 
istically from the others: 
The model we are about to propose is "symmetric" in 
the sense that changing the party labeled J does not 
affect anything of substantive importance. 
Aitchison (1986) proposes that compositional data 
like Vi be modeled with his additive logistic normal 
distribution. This distribution can be formed as follows. 
First let Yi be the vector of J - 1 log-ratios Yij = 
ln(VijlViJ), for party j (j = 1 . . . , J - 1) relative to 
party J .  Then assume that the (J - 1) X 1 vector Yi = 
(Yil, . . . , Yi(,-,)) is multivariate normal with mean 
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vector p and variance matrix Z. To get to the observed 
votes, use the multivariate logistic transformation: 
Although compositional data analysts have found 
this specification to be useful for their applications, we 
demonstrate below that it is inappropriate for multi- 
party voting data. In our data, a majority of districts 
tend to be more highly clustered, and a minority much 
more widely dispersed, than the multivariate normal 
implies. 
Political scientists modeling seats and votes have 
avoided this distributional problem by combining mix- 
tures of independent normals and appropriately cho- 
sen covariates, but these solutions are insufficient for a 
general approach to multiparty voting data. 
We now derive a new model that solves these 
problems. We label the distribution the additive logistic 
Student t (LT) distribution, which we demonstrate is 
superior when used to fit political data to the additive 
logistic normal, which it includes as a limiting special 
case. To derive the LT distribution, first let Yi be 
multivariate Student t (Johnson and Kotz 1972) and 
then apply the transformation in equation 4: 
= T[ln(Vi/Vir>l pi, Z]lnJ-l  Vii 
j= 1 
where the extra factor in the denominator is the 
Jacobian of the transformation (required when creat- 
ing a new distribution from an existing one through a 
deterministic transformation), the expected value and 
variance of Y,,. are pq and 2v/(v-2), and v (v > 0) is the 
degrees of freedom parameter. The (J - 1) X (J - 1) 
parameter Z is known as the scatter matrix. This 
distribution happens to be equivalent to the predictive 
distribution, under certain conditions, when using the 
additive logistic normal (see Aitchison 1986, 174). 
This model differs from the additive logistic normal 
when v < w, and it differs more the smaller is v. We 
find in practice that our estimates of v are fairly small, 
and thus the LT distribution differs significantly from 
the additive logistic normal.6 For example, Figure 3 
gives two ternary diagrams with normal (for A) and t 
(for B) confidence regions fit to real electoral data 
SO that we consider only cases in which the moments exist on the 
logistic scale, we impose the technical restriction that v > 2. This 
assumption, while not necessary for our model or estimator (since 
the moments of the additive logistic t are always finite), does make 
estimation and simulation simpler. Given that our estimates of v stay 
far from the boundary (even when permitted to do otherwise), this 
technical assumption is unambiguously supported by our data. 
FIGURE 3. The Fit of the Logistic Normal 
and Logistic t Distribtions 
A. Normal Based Confidence Regions 
B. t Based Confidence Regions 
Note: Both graphs give a ternary diagram for 1970 British House of 
Commons electoral data, with uncontested districts deleted, and 50% 
and 95% confidence regions based on the additive logistic normal in (A) 
and additive logistic t in (B). The better fit to the t distribution is indicated 
by the approximately 50% and 95% of the constituencies that fall within 
the 50% and 95% confidence region, respectively, for thet distribution, 
but only 64% and 91 % for the normal. Note also how the inner region 
is much narrower, and the outer region is wider, for the t than the 
normal. 
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(from 1970). For both, the inner loop is the 50% 
confidence region; if the model is appropriate, half the 
points should fall within it. In fact, 66.7% fall within the 
normal-based region, whereas 48.5% fall within the 
t-based region. A similar situation, but slightly less 
extreme, holds for the 95% confidence region, which is 
the outer loop in both graphs. (Because of the large 
number of constituencies, the figure is more useful for 
understanding the differences in how the two models fit 
these data and the nature of confidence regions on the 
simplex, rather than making it easy to count points 
within each region.) This demonstrate~s clearly the 
advantage of the t distribution for British electoral 
data.7 
When v is sufficiently large, the normal and t distri- 
butions are identical. This means that our generaliza- 
tion has great potential benefits, because it fits a much 
wider range of data more common in multiparty de- 
mocracies, and it is also essentially costless (i.e., except 
for the trivial efficiency loss caused by estimating the 
extra degrees of freedom parameter). Given this risk 
profile, there seems little reason not to use this more 
general model. 
The generalization that the additive logistic t pro- 
vides would be traditionally described (by using the 
general textbook description for t-based distributions) 
as allowing for "fatter tailsn-a small number of con- 
stituencies surprisingly (according to the normal) far 
from the center of the distribution. This description is 
accurate, but perhaps a more informative characteriza-' 
tion is the other half of the story: When v is small, most 
of the constituencies are surprisingly (according to the 
normal) heavily clustered together (compare the inner 
confidence region in the two graphs in Figure 3). That 
is, what the traditional description of t-based distribu- 
tions misses is that when v is small, a t distribution with 
the same variance as a normal has both fat tails and 
heavier cluster around the mode. The two features 
must exist simultaneously to counterbalance each 
other, in order that the result is a proper distribution. 
Our reason for also emphasizing the heavy cluster is 
that this describes more of the points than focusing on 
the relatively small number of outliers in the tails. 
As can be seen by the counts of districts within the 
confidence regions in Figure 3, the additive logistic t 
model fits the data better than the additive logistic 
normal. The substantive reason is that most constitu- 
encies in England have vote fractions that are very 
similar to one another, but a smaller set of constituen- 
cies are quite far from this main cluster. 
In Figure 4 we present summaries of the fit of the 
two distributions for all the elections in our data. It 
shows for each election year the percentage of districts 
that fall within the 50%, 80%, and 95% confidence 
regions. Figure 4A shows that for the additive logistic 
normal model, the actual fractions of points within 
each of these regions (indicated by solid lines) vary 
7 The fit of the model could be closer to a normal after conditioning 
on explanatory variables, but our studies indicate that this is not 
usually the case with our multiparty data. We present the simple case 
in Figure 3, without covariates, for ease of presentation. 
quite a distance from the theoretically correct (straight 
dotted) lines. (For visual clarity, the solid lines connect 
the points at the elections, where the estimation was 
actually conducted.) In contrast, the actual and theo- 
retical values are very close for the additive logistic t, 
portrayed in Figure 4B. The normal seems to fit better 
for more recent elections than it once did, but there is 
no reason to think that this trend will continue. 
For applications, we let the means of the log-ratios 
be linear functions of vectors of explanatory variables: 
where Xij is a pj x 1 vector of explanatory variables, 
and p, are parameters to be estimated. For most 
applications the explanatory variables will be the same 
for all j, but this is not required. The parameters pj, 2, 
and v are of little direct interest, but we show below 
how to compute quantities of interest from them. 
ASSUMPTIONS FOR PARTLY CONTESTED 
DISTRICTS 
We now introduce methods of generalizing the basic 
model to allow for districts in which some parties do 
not contest the outcome. 
We follow King and Gelman (1991) by setting as the 
goal of estimation the effective vote-values of VU that 
we would observe if all J parties contested the election 
in district i. In districts with all parties contesting, the 
effective vote is the observed vote. In partly contested 
districts, the effective vote for all parties is unobserved 
but can be estimated. (That is, in districts in which any 
party chooses not to contest, we lose information about 
the effective vote proportion for all parties, since those 
that contest might get different vote fractions if they 
were to face more competition.) 
The effective vote concept covers all "national" 
political parties, even if they do not contest all elec- 
tions. We distinguish regional parties and do not try to 
estimate strained counterfactuals, such as what would 
happen if the Scottish nationalists ran in English 
constituencies. Regional parties are easy to include in 
our model, but for expository purposes we omit this 
issue here. 
In order to analyze the effective vote in districts not 
fully contested, some assumptions must be made. We 
introduce several designed for electoral systems in 
which the candidates and parties decide for themselves 
whether to contest a district election.8 A reasonable 
assumption under these circumstances is that a non- 
contesting party would not have won if it had nomi- 
nated a candidate. After all, if they would have won, 
they probably would have nominated someone in the 
Other assumptions would be necessary when, for example, a 
progovernment election commission prevents opposition parties 
from entering a race because they might win, as occurs in some 
fledgling Eastern European democracies. Similarly, when a small 
party makes a deal with a larger party not to contest in certain areas 
(as in the recent New Zealand elections), these assumptions would 
not hold. Our model could be modified accordingly. In all cases, 
scholars should tune the model assumptions to what we know about 
the details of party politics. 
American Political Science Review Vol. 93, No. 1 
FIGURE 4. Confidence Region Coverage 
A. Coverage of Normal Confidence Regions 
Year 
B. Coverage of t Confidence Regions 
Note: These graphs summarize the fit of the additive logistic normal (A) and additive logistic t (B) distributions for all U.K. elections in our data set. For 
each election, the solid lines mark the percentage of coverage for the 50%, 80%, and 95% confidence regions (where dotted lines are drawn). The better 
fit of the t distribution is indicated by the actual number of constituencies within each region (indicated by the solid line) staying much closer to the dotted 
line for the t than for the normal. 
first place. Even if this assumption is false, it is unlikely that did nominate candidates, and so we expand the 
that any statistical analyst can devise a more realistic assumption to this more encompassing version. We 
assumption than the noncontesting party is effectively recognize that this broader assumption occasionally 
able to do for us. may not hold. In other words, it is conceivable that the 
It also seems highly likely that the noncontesting noncontesting party, if it ran, might get more votes 
party would have received fewer votes than the parties (and yet still lose) than one of the parties that chose to 
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run. Yet, even if this assumption were violated, the 
degree of violation would very rarely be large enough 
to make a substantive difference. Moreover, the alter- 
native possible assumptions are more arbitrary and 
would be difficult to justify. 
Other assumptions could be chosen, based on mod- 
els of candidate entry and exit for different electoral 
svstems or on different features of the British electoral 
system (such as the loss of a monetary deposit by 
candidates who do not receive a certain fraction of the 
vote). Our methods for deriving the model below 
under our chosen assumptions can be easily modified 
to handle these alternatives. 
If covariates that predict which parties contest in 
each constituency are available, then they can be used 
in interactions with indicator variables that code for the 
patterns of uncontestedness in order to avoid assump- 
tions about parameter equivalence between district 
elections that are fully and partly contested. In most 
cases, these variables will be useful but not necessary. 
An alternative is to develop full-blown models that 
predict which parties contest in each district as sepa- 
rate equations. Although future researchers may wish 
to consider this approach, we do not pursue it because 
it is unnecessary, would make the model less robust, 
and would require data that are very hard to obtain in 
most applications. 
We make no assumption analogous to "indepen- 
dence of irrelevant alternatives," as is sometimes nec- 
essary for individual-level, survey-based statistical 
models of multiparty voter choice (see Alvarez and 
Nagler n.d.). That is, our assumptions, and the model 
built from them, allow the entry or exit of a party into 
a district election contest to affect the relative vote 
totals of the parties already in the race. 
ESTIMATION 
In this section, we propose methods of estimating the 
parameters of the model, P = {Pj}, Z, and v. In the 
next section, we explain how to compute quantities of 
interest given these results. 
If all districts are contested by all parties, we can 
estimate the parameters by maximum likelihood. That 
is, we would maximize the log of the additive logistic t 
distribution in equation 5, summed over all observa- 
tions, with respect to the parameters. Complications 
arise in partly contested districts, however. One attrac- 
tive approach for missing data problems such as this is 
to use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods 
(see Tanner 1997). For example, impute the missing 
data given a guess for the parameters; then estimate 
the parameters given these "completed" data via max- 
imum likelihood; then use these better parameter 
estimates to impute more realistic values for the miss- 
ing data; and so on, until (stochastic) convergence. 
We implemented a version of the MCMC approach, 
but in our experience and with our three-party data, 
this procedure is relatively slow, primarily because each 
of the two steps in every iteration is itself iterative. We 
offer a direct likelihood approach that is approximately 
twenty times faster. Our studies indicate that this 
alternative is faster for smaller numbers of parties, but 
the MCMC approach may be more computationally 
efficient for larger numbers of parties. 
Our description of the direct likelihood approach 
begins by denoting the set of parties contesting the 
election in district i as Pi, a set that can take on seven 
patterns: (1, 2, 3), (2, 31, (1, 3), (1, 21, {I), (21, and 
{3>.9 
When the effective vote is observed for all parties, 
the likelihood is the probability density of the observed 
variables. For simplicity, we write the likelihood as a 
function of Y, rather than V,, although the two give 
equivalent results. For districts with fully contested 
elections, the observed vote (V:l, V:, V:3) equals the 
effective vote (Vil, Viz, Vi3). Thus, Yil = 1n(VillK3) 
and Y,, = ln(Vi,IK3) are both observed, and the 
likelihood function is the bivariate t probability density: 
with parameters 
(and where ul, u,, and p make up the scatter matrix). 
This density differs from the additive logistic t for Vi in 
equation 5 by a constant factor (the Jacobian of the 
transformation), which thus establishes the equiva- 
lence of writing the likelihood as a function of either Vi 
or Y,. 
When some of the effective votes are not observed 
(due to noncontesting parties), our assumptions desig- 
nate a region in which the vote variable falls, in which 
case the likelihood is the area (or volume) under the 
probability density corresponding to this known region. 
The Appendix derives the likelihood function for these 
cases. 
The complete likelihood function is the product of 
the likelihoods for the fully contested case in equation 
7 as well as the partially contested cases derived in the 
Appendix and given in equations 12,15, 16, 17,18, and 
19: 
where we define the product over a null set (when no 
district election of the type exists) as equaling unity. 
We also substitute pil = XilPl and piz = Xi& to 
introduce (overlapping, identical, or different sets of) 
covariates Xi, and Xi,. For our present application, we 
define Xi, and Xi, to include a lag of Yil, a lag of Y,,, 
and three indicator variables to represent incumbency 
status for each party. We have conducted many other 
runs with demographics and other variables included, 
but, as is consistent with the results from analyses in the 
United States and other democracies, these tend to 
have only minor effects on our estimates of incumbency 
advantage. Since our goal is to estimate the total causal 
effect of incumbency status, we exclude covariates that 
9 Suppose they held an election and nobody ran? We ignore this 
amusing eighth possible pattern, despite its occasional appearance in 
some very low-visibility local U.S. elections. In general, the number 
of patterns of missing data is 2J. 
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are consequences of this key causal variable (for the 
same reason that in estimating the effect of an individ- 
ual's unemployment on his or her vote, we would not 
wish to control for voting intentions five minutes before 
walking into the voting booth; see Cox and Katz 1996; 
Gelman and King 1990; and King, Keohane, and Verba 
1994, 173-5). 
To facilitate maximization, and to make the asymp- 
totic normal approximations we use below feasible with 
fewer observations, it is helpful to reparameterize so 
that all parameters are unbounded (ranging between 
-a and w), as p1 and p, already are. Thus, the full set 
of transformations is: 
where the form of the equation for $, is the inverse of 
Fisher's Z transformation (keeping p between - 1 and 
1 no matter what value $, takes) and that for $, 
constrains v to be greater than two in order to guaran- 
tee that the moments of the distribution on the logistic 
scale exist. 
To summarize all our knowledge about and uncer- 
tainty in the parameter vector 
we maximize the likelihood function. This gives us an 
asymptotic normal posterior distribution with the max- 
imum likelihood point estimates as a mean vector and, 
as usual, the inverse of the negative of the Hessian as 
the variance matrix10 
Because maximum likelihood is invariant to repa- 
rameterization (see King 1989b), the same point esti- 
mates are obtained whether we estimate $ and trans- 
form to get $ or estimate $ directly. We also use the 
standard empirical Bayes approach to specify normal 
priors (i.e., the hyperparameters are estimated from 
the means and variances of the maximum likelihood 
estimates across our ten election years). Our empirical 
results below are qualitatively the same as with 
straightforward maximum likelihood, but, as usual, 
empirical Bayes helps to reduce the random variability 
across and within years. 
COMPUTING QUANTITIES OF INTEREST 
Because the point of developing a model of voting in a 
multiparty democracy is to explain and predict election 
lo We verified this asymptotic normal approximation by comparisons 
with the exact (i.e., fmite sample) posterior distribution, thus avoid- 
ing the large-n assumption altogether. We did this with the technique 
of importance sampling, an iterative simulation method based on a 
probabilistic rejection algorithm (see Tanner 1997). Our experiments 
indicate that the point estimates we report below are correct, and the 
standard errors are if anything conservative (is., somewhat larger 
than they should be). Because importance sampling is very compu- 
tationally intensive and hence would be more difficult for others to 
apply, and since we found that the two approaches did not suggest 
any real substantive differences in our data, the analyses below are 
based on the asymptotic normal approximation. 
results, our model ought to be capable of computing 
quantities on the scale of reported votes. That is, the 
estimated $ parameters that result from maximizing 
the likelihood are important, but they are of little direct 
interest. For starters, they are reparameterized for 
estimation via equation 10. But even transforming back 
to the original $ scale, by inverting these equations, is 
not very helpful since the estimation was done on the 
additive logistic scale rather than on the scale of 
substantive interest-the votes. The quantities of direct 
substantive interest are complicated functions of these 
parameters. 
Computing some of these quantities of interest is 
possible analytically (through Taylor series approxima- 
tions and the like), but it would be difficult. Computing 
many others is impossible. We simplify these problems 
by substituting computer time for human effort via an 
increasingly popular technique called random simula- 
tion (also called stochastic simulation, Monte Carlo 
simulation, etc.) (see Gelman et al. 19'95; Jackman 
1996; Tanner 1997). Because simulation can generate 
results with any desired degree of precision, the tech- 
nique entails no compromises (given a sufficiently 
powerful computer). The methods for interpretation 
and presentation we use here are also applicable in the 
context of most other statistical models (see King, 
Tomz, and Wittenberg 1998). 
We describe the calculation of three quantities of 
interest in this section, a predicted vote, an expected 
Vote, and a causal effect. With each, we use a combi- 
nation of classical and Bayesian techniques. We save 
the calculation of other quantities, such as bias and 
responsiveness, for a future article. 
Predicted Vote 
The quantity of interest here is the probability distri- 
bution describing the predicted allocation of votes in a 
district conditional on a fixed value for each of the 
explanatory variables. The prediction is therefore a 
probability distribution over the simplex. 
Our first requirement is a method for drawing one 
random election result from the approximate posterior 
distribution given the estimated model, which we label 
(ppl, rp,, Vp3), where p is prediction and the tilde 
indicates that the values have been simulated. We draw 
this simulated district election result given a set of 
values for the explanatory variables Xpl and X , (each 
being row vectors). To accomplish t h ~ s  we fofiow this 
algorithm: 
Maximize the likelihood function in equation 9 
(with the empirical Bayes priors), and r~cord  the 
vector of maximum likelihood estimates, $, and the 
variance matrix, V(C$). 
Take one random draw of $, which we designate as 6, from a mu1tivaria;e Annormal distribution with 
mean $ and variance V($).  
Reparameterize from 6 to (J by using equation 10, 
where we use Xpl and Xp, in computing ppl and 
PP2. 
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4. Draw ypl and Yp2 randomly from a bivariate t 
distribution with parameters +. 
5. Compute ppl, P , and T/,! deterministically from Fpl and Fp2 by t$ multivar~ate logistic transforma- 
tion in equation 4. 
To compute the distribution of election results given 
X,, we repeat steps 2-5 of this algorithm M times (we 
find that M = 1,000 is sufficient for most purposes). 
Then our approximate posterior distribution of Vpl is 
merely a histogram of the simulated values. A point 
estimate of the three-party vote results can be com- 
puted by taking the numerical average of the simula- 
tions for each party. A standard error can be computed 
by taking the standard deviation of the simulations for 
each party. Similarly, a (say) 80% confidence interval 
can be computed by sorting the values in numerical 
order and taking the values at the 10th and 90th 
percentiles. The full approximate posterior distribution 
may be calculated by a two-dimensional histogram over 
the simplex. 
For an example of simulating predictive quantities of 
interest, we give an inference about a predicted value 
from a typical open seat. To be specific, we first 
estimated the model for 1987 with lags of Y,, and Y,, 
and two indicators for incumbency status. We included 
all variables in both equations. We then set the explan- 
atory variables (Xpl and X,,) such that no candidate 
standing for election is a member of the House of 
Commons, and the previous vote (i.e., in 1983) is equql 
to the average vote across constituencies (V,, = 0.46, 
V = 0.28, and VpA = 0.26). We then applied the 
ahirithm above to yield 500 simulations of the three 
vote vectors. 
We use two graphical methods for portraying the 
results from this prediction, both shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 5A plots the 500 simulations in one ternary 
diagram. The simulations are all predictions for a 
single district and thus vary only due to uncertainty in 
the prediction; the collection of dots in this figure then 
portrays the full nature of the probabilistic prediction 
about where the point (given the values of the explan- 
atory variables) is likely to be. That is, we have higher 
confidence that the actual district vote in the average 
open seat district will be where the heavy cluster of t i e  
dots falls, and the result will fall with smaller probabil- 
ity where there are fewer dots. Substantively, the result 
shows that this typical district is very likely to be won by 
the Conservatives, since most of the points fall into the 
upper third of the triangle. (The actual probability that 
this district will be won by the Conservatives equals ihe 
fraction of simulated dots that fall in this top region, 
defined bv the win lines.) 
Figure 5B gives density estimates (smooth versions 
of histograms) for each of the three vote variables. This 
graph helps emphasize the separate, but still obviously 
related, nature of the three variables. Each density 
estimate portrayed in the graph is an approximate 
posterior distribution of that quantity (i.e., it can be 
thought of as a pile of predictions or simulations), 
indicating where the future value of that vote is likely 
to be. Judging from the very little overlap in the 
FIGURE 5. Simulations of a Predicted Value 
A. Ternary Plot of Predicted Votes 
Note: This figure interprets the results of a model by computing the 
distributional implications of a single prediction (for an open seat in the 
constituency with the average vote). Graph A plots 500 simulations from 
this prediction on a ternary diagram; Graph B gives density estimates of 
the simulations from the same three vote variables. According to the 
prediction, the district's vote heavily favors the Conservatives. 
B. Density Plot of Predicted Votes 
14 
distributions, it is highly likely that the Conservatives 
will out-poll the Labour and Alliance parties. The 
Labour Party will likely do better than the Alliance in 
this constituency, but because of the heavy overlap in 
these two distributions, this inference is less certain. 
Note that all information in B can also be found in A, 
although the images emphasize different aspects of the 
data. 
In an application with a variety of explanatory vari- 
12- 
' P A  'PL 'PC 
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ables, we would normally do many different computa- 
tions such as this. That would enable the researcher to 
understand the many substantive implications of mod- 
els like this. To do so, we would set the explanatory 
variables at many different sets of values (low income 
and heavily minority, high income and rural, etc.). In 
this situation, we may wish more parsimonious summa- 
ries of the simulations, such as point estimates, stan- 
dard errors, and confidence intervals. 
Expected Vote 
Our knowledge of all real-world random processes is 
affected by both fundamental variability and estimation 
variability. The latter results from the limited number 
of observations collected (or the limited number of 
districts analyzed). If n were very large, then estimation 
variability would vanish. In contrast, even if we had an 
infinite number of observations, the fundamental vari- 
ability in the real world would still prevent our vote 
predictions from being perfect. Estimation variability is 
introduced because of the investigators' "failings," 
whereas fundamental variability affects results because 
the world we study is intrinsically variable. 
Our procedure for computing the predicted vote 
reflects both sources of variability. In the preceding 
algorithm, step 2 simulates estimation variability (by 
drawing + from its distribution), and step 4 simulates 
fundamental variability (by drawing the logit of the 
vote variables from a t distribution). Since we wished 
the simulations to reflect our knowledge of the distri- 
bution of votes, both sources of variability were essen- 
tial. 
Closely related to computing the predicted vote is 
estimating the expected vote in a district: [E(Vpl), 
E(Vp2), E(Vp3)]. Like the predicted vote, the expected 
vote also is conditional on chosen values of the explan- 
atory variables, X,. Although fundamental variability 
affects our estimate of the expected value, we need to 
average over it to produce the expectation. In other 
words, the expected vote is fixed, and only our estima- 
tion of it is imperfect: If n were sufficiently large, then 
the expected vote simulations would be constant. In 
practice, of course, our estimation procedure will pro- 
duce uncertain estimates of the (fixed) expected vote.11 
To compute one simulation of the expected vote, 
which we denote [E(v,,), E(v,,), E(vP3)], we follow 
this algorithm. 
1. Maximize the likelihood function in equation 9 .  
(with the empirical Bayes priors), and keep the 
vector of maximum iikelihood estimates, +, and the 
variance matrix, V(+) . 
2. Take one random draw of +, which we designate as 
6 ,  from a multivariate nnormal distribution with 
mean + and variance V(+). 
3. Reparameterize from 6 to t$ by using equation 10, 
l1 The difference between the expected vote and the predicted vote 
resides primarily in the variability around the mean. If the model 
were linear, then the average of the simulations of the predicted and 
expected vote would be identical; in our case, the two are close. 
where we use X,, and Xp2 in computing ppl and 
pp2, respectively. 
4. Draw m values of Fpl and Fp2 randomly from a 
bivariate t distribution with parameters I$. (m = 
100 is usually sufficient.) 
5. Compute m simulations of vel and vp2 detcrminis- 
tically from each of the m simulations of Ypl and Fp2 by using the multivariate logistic transformation 
in equation 4. 
6. Calculate the numerical average of the m simula- 
tions of vpl and rp2 to yield one simulation of the 
expected votes, E(Vpl) and E(v,,), respectively. 
Compute the simulation of !he expected vote for 
party J = 3 by subtraction: E(V,,) = 1 - E(Vp1) 
- E(VP2). 
We repeat steps 2-6 of this algorithm M times to 
produce M simulations of the expected vote, the mean 
of which is our point estimate, the standard deviation is 
the standard error, and a histogram ofkach component 
is the full probability density (M = 1,000 is usually 
sufficient). 
Causal Effects, Including Incumbency 
Advantage 
A causal effect is the difference between two expected 
votes, given a change in the value of only one explan- 
atory variable. For example, the incumbency advantage 
is the difference in the expected vote in a district with 
an incumbent running and the expected vote in the 
same district at the same time when the incumbent's 
party decides to nominate the best available nonincum- 
bent willing to run (Gelman and King 1990). That is, 
under this thought experiment, everything is held con- 
stant up to the start of the general election campaign, 
at which point the incumbent either runs for reelection 
or does not. 
The causal effect of incumbency status in multiparty 
democracies is, of course, somewhat more complicated 
than in two-party systems. The effect on the expected 
vote of, for example, a Conservative incumbent seeking 
reelection may be of a different magnitude than for an 
Alliance or Labour incumbent. Such a partisan differ- 
ential also would seem more likely in legislatures with 
more parties. In multiparty democracies, we might 
estimate the incumbency advantage averaged over the 
parties, but we prefer to estimate each separately in 
order to highlight several interesting substantive differ- 
ences in our data. 
Computing a causal effect thus requires two sets of 
expected votes, one with an incumbent and the other 
without. To draw simulations of the causal effect of 
incumbency, we take the difference between a simula- 
tion of the expected vote when the incumbency status 
variable in Xp indicates (1) a particular party's incum- 
bent is running for reelection and (2) an open seat, 
with all other variables held constant at (say) their 
means. That is, we maximize the likelihood and then 
run the expected value algorithm twice, with a change 
only in the incumbency status variable. 
We estimated the advantage due to three types of 
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FIGURE 6. Incumbency Advantage 
Effect of Conservative lncumbent 
59 64 66 70 74(F) 74(0) 79 83 87 92 S.E. 
Effect of Labour lncumbent 
-1.0 I C  A 
59 64 66 70 74(F) 74(0) 79 83 87 92 S.E. 
Effect of Alliance lncumbent 
59 64 66 70 74(F) . 7 4 0  79 83 87 92 S.E. 
Note: The vertical distance of each arrow above the line indicates the advantage of running an incumbent, as compared to a nonincumbent, to the party 
indicated. The direction of the arrow shows from which of the other parties support is being drawn (as indicated by the ends of the standard error bars, 
at the right). Note that the scale, in percentage points for all three parties, is larger for the Alliance graph than for the other two. 
changes in incumbency status-open seat to a Conser- 
vative incumbent, an open seat to a Labour incumbent, 
and an open seat to an Alliance incumbent-in each of 
the ten election years from 1959 to 1992. The addi- 
tional complication is that for one year, and for one 
type of incumbency effect, we need to record changes 
to all three vote variables. To display all this informa- 
tion succinctly, we have devised a new graphical dis- 
play. Figure 6 presents the raw results for each year 
and type of effect. The top panel shows the effect of a 
Conservative incumbent, and each arrow in the large 
left portion of this graphic is the change from an open 
seat-which we construct so that it begins at the point 
on the line at the year indicated-to where the ex- 
pected vote would be with a Conservative incumbent, 
as if each were part of a ternary diagram. Hence, the 
higher each arrow extends vertically (i.e., not the length 
of the arrow, although the two are obviously related), 
the larger is the incumbency advantage to the Conser- 
vatives. The left axis is in percentage points of incum- 
bency advantage. 
The direction each arrow leans indicates from which 
party the Conservatives draw votes when they run an 
incumbent versus running another candidate in an 
open contest, with the vertices of the implicit ternary 
diagram indicated around the standard errors at the 
right. (Note also that there is a standard error in each 
direction, indicated by the length of each of the stan- 
dard error arrows at the right.12) For example, the 
arrow for 1964 Alliance incumbents leans away from 
the bottom left, which means Alliance incumbents get 
electoral advantage by drawing votes disproportion- 
ately from Labour Party candidates (L in the standard 
error part of the graph on the right). (Arrows at angles 
between the extremes indicated on the standard error 
graph draw from a proportionate combination of the 
two other parties.) Thus, in the top panel, since all the 
arrows lean at least somewhat to the right, Conserva- 
tive incumbents derive their advantage by drawing 
more from the Alliance than from the Labour Party. 
To our knowledge, this type of effect has not been 
estimated in the elections literature of any country. 
The most striking observation about Figure 6 is the 
unambiguous positive effect of incumbency, for all ten 
12 Because the Alliance receives many fewer votes on average than 
the other parties, the maximum range of votes that could be drawn 
from the Alliance to form an incumbency advantage for any other 
party's incumbent is quite small. As a result, the Alliance standard 
errors in figures 6 and 7 are smaller than for the Conservatives or 
Labour. 
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FIGURE 7. Average Incumbency Advantage 
Conse wative 
Average S.E. 
Labour 
Average S.E. 
Average S.E. 
Note: This figure gives the incumbency advantage averaged over all the 
years portrayed in Figure 6, for which the interpretation is analogous. 
Note the scale for the Alliance graph, which is larger than the others. 
elections and all three parties over half a century of 
British politics. This is indicated by all 30 arrows 
pointing above the zero line. Most of the individual 
effects in Figure 6 are larger than their standard errors. 
When pooled, the average effects for each party's 
incumbent are from two to five times their standard 
errors, and hence by any relevant statistical standard 
they are clearly greater than zero. 
Figure 7 gives these average effects for each party. 
(As always, the standard error of an average is smaller 
than the standard error of its independent component 
parts.) The summary in Figure 7 indicates that the 
average incumbency effect is about half a percentage 
point for the Conservatives and twice that for Labour. 
In fact, in every one of the ten elections shown in 
Figure 6, the Labour incumbency effect is larger than 
the Conservative effect. Our interpretation of this 
disparity (which is necessarily more speculative than 
our results) is that Labour incumbents have a working- 
class constituency that benefits more from government 
services than Conservative voters. Incumbents have the 
discretion to influence the position of people on vari- 
ous types of lists for social services, such as to get into, 
or renovate, council housing. Conservative incumbents 
have fewer such opportunities to serve their relatively 
more wealthy constituents, so their incumbency advan- 
tage should not be as large. 
Alliance incumbents receive an advantage of three 
percentage points (thrice the Labour advantage). This 
is less than the incumbency advantage af 8-9 percent- 
age points in the U.S. House of Representatives 
(Gelman and King 1990), but it is only slightly smaller 
than the average advantage in the House in the mid- 
1960s or in most American state legislatures today 
(King 1991). This effect is in part because the counter- 
factual involved in an open seat versus an Alliance 
incumbent is much less likely in parts of Britain than 
the analogous counterfactual involved for estimating 
major party incumbency effects. An Alliance incum- 
bent implies that the major party hold on the political 
' system has been broken, and voters take this cue to 
reevaluate their votes. Expressed another way, the 
collective action problem of moderate voters who 
prefer the Alliance but do not want to waste their vote 
is solved with an Alliance incumbent in office. They 
have less reason to vote strategically ("tactically," as it 
is called in Britain) and instead cast their vote for their 
sincere preference. Much more than the major parties, 
the Alliance runs local, almost U.S.-style, candidate- 
centered campaigns (sometimes nominating well- 
known nonpolitical personalities), rather than national, 
party-oriented campaigns. The result, we believe, is the 
large Alliance incumbency advantage. 
Taken together, our findings support the claims of 
the new quantitative literature on the existence of the 
incumbency effect in Britain, but the size of the effect 
for all three parties is substantially smaller than previ- 
ous biased methods had indicated. That is, our method 
is not biased and is also sufficiently powerful to be able 
to distinguish a small (but politically meaningful) effect 
from none at all. Our method is also able to discern 
distinctly different incumbency effects across the three 
parties. 
There appears to be a hint in the top panel of Figure 
6 that the Conservative incumbency advantage may be 
growing slightly, but formal statistical tests clearly 
reject this possible trend. Moreover, Labour or Alli- 
ance incumbency effects display no such apparent 
pattern. Thus, we find no support for the other claim of 
the new quantitative literature, which argues, against 
the conventional wisdom, that the incumbency advan- 
tage has been dramatically increasing in recent years. 
When the Conservatives run an incumbent (as com- 
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pared to no incumbent running), they pull most of their 
extra incumbency advantage from the Alliance. As 
explained, this can be seen because the arrow in the 
first panel of Figure 7 and all ten arrows in the first 
panel of Figure 6 lean to the right-away from the "A" 
in the standard error diagram. Our interpretation of 
this clear result is that the Alliance is a transitional 
option for voters on the way to supporting one of the 
major parties; only 20% of voters stick with the Alli- 
ance for more than one election (Butler and Stokes 
1969,315-38). Presumably because the Labour incum- 
bency advantage stems more from constituency service 
than does the Conservatives' advantage (and because 
there are usually as many Conservative voters who 
could benefit from a Labour member's constituency 
services as there are voters for the much smaller 
Alliance who could benefit), Labour incumbents pull 
approximately equally from the Conservatives and the 
Alliance (see Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987).l3 
CONCLUQING REMARKS 
Our results may help resolve an ongoing debate in the 
British elections literature. The conventional position 
is that incumbency has never been an advantage. In 
contrast, a newer literature holds that incumbency 
advantage is moderate to large and is growing. With 
our approach, we find that both sides are right to an 
extent. That is, the incumbency advantage in England 
is small but meaningfully above zero. There is no 
evidence, however, that it is trending in any direction. 
In addition, our model detects important differences 
among the parties, with the incumbency advantage for 
Labour being about twice that for the Conservatives, and 
the advantage for the Alliance triple that of Labour. 
We have developed and presented our statistical 
model for three parties and applied it to the British 
electoral system. The model and estimation procedures 
are all directly applicable to electoral systems with any 
number of parties. Further research will be necessary 
to implement the more general version of our model. 
Our analytical approach, while much faster for three 
parties, does not scale up as well as a more general 
MCMC approach. Our experiments with MCMC ap- 
plied to this problem convince us that it will scale fairly 
well. Priors may be needed, given the large number of 
parameters relative to a smaller number of districts, 
but there is substantial information in multiparty elec- 
toral systems that would be extraordinarily valuable to 
researchers in comparative politics, so this extension 
seems well worth the effort. Our graphical displays 
obviously do not generalize directly to more than four 
parties, but with judicious use of color, shading, and 
l3 The Alliance does not predictably draw more from either major 
party. There is one other feature of the last panel of Figure 6,  
however, that may reflect a systematic pattern: Alliance incumbency 
advantage was drawn almost exclusively from the Labour Party 
between 1959 and 1970, but this abruptly changed, and votes started 
to be drawn in different ways from Labour and the Conservatives 
over the subsequent six elections. Since this "pattern" is based on 
only four elections, further research is required before drawing firm 
substantive conclusions as to its cause. 
perspective, we have found it possible to display results 
for up to eight parties, depending on how complicated 
and empirically clear the relationships are in the data. 
Many opportunities for future research remain, three 
of which we note here. First, we can easily extend the 
interpretation of the model to include other quantities of 
interest, such as bias and responsiveness of the electoral 
system, which are important and controversial issues in 
Britain and elsewhere. This can be done by clearly 
defining the quantity to be computed and then making 
slight modifications of the algorithms described above. 
Second, some two-party models of seats and votes 
have in recent incarnations included random effects 
terms, which are more highly modeled versions of what 
our empirical Bayes approach accomplishes for the 
multiparty case. These terms help keep the estimates 
reasonable even if certain types of explanatory vari- 
ables are not observed and included in the model. They 
are especially well suited to modelsn of legislatures, 
since the structure of the random effects model can 
reflect the panel structure of the data. 
Finally, electoral systems vary considerably across 
countries. All but two countries have districts of some 
kind, and most elect legislators to more than one seat 
in a district. Modifications to fit all the different types 
of electoral systems will require some detailed work, 
but these should be achievable by straightforward 
extensions of the model presented here. 
APPENDIX: THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION 
FOR PARTIALLY CONTESTED DISTRICTS 
Districts with Two of Three Parties 
Contesting 
First consider elections in which the parties contesting in 
district i include Pi = ( 2 ,  3). The effective votes for all three 
parties, Vil, Vi2, and Vi3, are unobserved. Nevertheless, our 
assumptions for less-than-fully contested elections intro- 
duced above imply that we have some information about 
these quantities. In particular, we know that Vil < min (Viz, 
Vi3) and therefore Yi, < min (0, Yi2) or, equivalently, Yl < 
0 and Yl < Y2. Thus, the likelihood function for this case is 
as follows: 
where F, is the cumulative distribution function of the 
(univariate) t ,  
is the conditional mean of Yi2 given Yil, and 
is the conditional variance. These conditional t distributions 
are analogous and mathematically similar to the more com- 
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monly known conditional normals (see Liu 1994). The func- 
tion in equation 12 is easily calculated by one-dimensional 
numerical integration. 
By a parallel logic, the likelihood function for district 
elections in which parties 1 and 3 contest is: 
When parties 1 and 2 contest, but party 3 is missing, a slight 
computational difference occurs because Vi3 appears in the 
denominator of both Yil and Yi2. As a result, we know, by our 
assumption, that Vi3 < min (Vi,, ViJ, which translates into 
Yi, > 0 and Yi2 > 0. Hence: 
where F, is the cumulative distribution function of (in this 
context) the bivariate t .  To compute this function, we follow 
the standard procedure of applying one-dimensional numer- 
ical integration after factoring the joint t distribution into a 
marginal and conditional-directly analogous to equation 12. 
Districts with One of Three Parties 
Contesting 
When only party 1 contests (and hence automatically wins), 
we have no information about Yi2, but we know that Yil > 0. 
We use this information to form the likelihood function: 
Similarly, the likelihood function for the remaining two 
cases is 
and 
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